Executive Summary
The United States has always seen Brazil as a significant regional powerhouse, but its perceived importance has risen in the last decade. Due to Brazil’s economic strength, its hemispheric leadership, and its growing geostrategic role through multilateral international forums, it has become a vital player in both regional and global politics across numerous dimensions. While US recognition of Brazil’s political and economic emergence brought the question of how Washington should manage relations with Brasilia to the fore, the ability to translate this new awareness into concrete bilateral policies and partnerships remains difficult. Whether the US and Brazil will be willing and able to form a ‘special relationship’ remains unclear.
Introduction
In the last century, the US has viewed Brazil as an important nation on the world stage – based on the sheer size of its territory, economy, and population, as well as its shared Western values. At times, the US has pushed for a ‘special relationship’ with Brazil, recognizing its importance for hemispheric and global stability. During World War II, the US promised support for Brazil’s development agenda and, in exchange, Brazil became the only Latin American nation to send troops to Europe’s battlefields. Although the pledged alliance faded after the war, throughout the 1950s Brazil largely supported US Cold War policies, if at somewhat of a distance. This support continued under Brazil’s military government in the 1960s. During the 1970s the US – especially Henry Kissinger – tried to reaffirm the ‘special relationship’ between the two nations, envisioning greater consultation and cooperation on an array of issues. These efforts were scuttled by a Carter administration more concerned with Brazil’s equivocal position on human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. These differences led not to conflict, but to detachment between the two governments.
By the 1980s, relations tilted further toward tensions and away from commonalities. The US disapproved of Brazilian trade policies and of its hardline stance when negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other creditors in the wake of the debt crisis. As the largest of all Third World debtors, Brazil repeatedly refused to pay interest on its arrears, threatening the deals US banks were negotiating with other nations. Newly democratic Brazil and the United States were also at odds over US military involvement in Central America.
By the 1990s, the debt crisis was resolved, and Brazil again became a welcome partner for the United States in the evolving post-Cold War world. Even if few concrete actions were taken, Presidents Cardoso and Clinton agreed on many matters. Some progress was made in the realm of democracy. Both the US and Brazil supported the consolidation of democracy in the region and leaned on Paraguay to reverse the attempted coup by an army commander against the elected government in 1996. Later, Brazil would prove important in pushing through the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which binds all 34 active member states to strengthen and uphold democratic institutions in the hemisphere.
Yet, as globalization became the driver behind much of US foreign policy, trade again became a sticking point between the two nations. In particular, Brazil’s reluctance to fully support the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) frustrated the Clinton administration and thwarted a closer relationship.
Generalizing five decades of foreign policy, the US rhetorically recognized Brazil’s importance, but concrete, practical initiatives or partnerships were few. This left little in the way of tangible policy outcomes between the US and Brazil. Instead, the two countries maintained a fairly warm, if distant, status quo, befitting Washington’s viewpoint that Brazil occupied an influential — but not central — role in the world pecking order.
A Turning Point in US-Brazil Relations
The urgency for bilateral relations began to change in the last decade. While blessed with natural resources, an almost 200 million-strong domestic market, and a well diversified economy (with robust agricultural, mining, manufacturing and service sectors), for decades Brazil suffered from high inflation, exchange rate instability, and low growth. This chronic economic instability meant that while viewed as geographically and geostrategically important, Brazil was seen by many in Washington, to quote General Charles de Gaulle, as ‘not a serious country’.
These reservations began to fade with the rise of Brazil’s economy. Anchored by the 1994 Plan Real, Brazil finally tamed its historically high inflation through solid macroeconomic and monetary policies and embarked on a process of privatization and other economic reforms. Put in place by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, these initiatives were adopted and deepened by his leftist successor and current president Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva.
By 2001, Brazil’s ascent was recognized by the financial markets. Banking giant Goldman Sachs named it one of the countries — alongside Russia, India and China (BRICs) – that could potentially eclipse the G8 in the coming decades. By the mid 2000s, Brazil’s macroeconomic instability seemed fully relegated to the past, and its economy boomed with higher commodity prices and the long awaited expansion of its own middle class.
At the same time, climbing worldwide energy prices and rising concerns over climate change brought Brazil’s biofuel successes and technology to Washington’s attention. Brazil’s biofuel industry dates back to the 1970s when the military government launched an ethanol program mandating a blend of sugar cane ethanol into transportation fuel with the hope of weaning the country off its dependence on imported fossil fuels. The program gained competitive traction by the late 1980s when more than a third of the country’s motor vehicle fleet was running on pure ethanol. In the 1990s the program experienced some growing pains as a 1993 federal law increased the mandate to a 25% ethanol blend, and demand outstripped local supply. The later technological breakthrough of flex-fuel vehicles restored widespread confidence (and investment) in ethanol, allowing motorists to switch to any blend of gasoline and ethanol at anytime.
By the turn of the 21st century, Brazil boasted the most efficient biofuel production in the world, with volumes rivaling those of the United States, and vast expanses of pasture land ready for planting more sugar cane. In February 2008, the market share of ethanol surpassed that of traditional gasoline at Brazilian pumps, proving the market viability of alternative fuels in one of the world’s largest economies. Add to this the recent discovery of significant oil fields off its coast and Brazil’s image as a global energy leader was secured.
Politically, the United States came to see Brazil’s well-grounded democracy and President Lula’s centrist even-handedness – particularly in comparison to some of its neighbors such as Venezuela – as important for US interests in the hemisphere. In addition, Presidents George W. Bush and Lula seemed to genuinely like each other, encouraging greater efforts to work together.
For Washington, Brazil’s rise came at a propitious time, one of changing policies and priorities. As the Bush administration took on two wars abroad, little bandwidth remained for policing its own hemisphere, despite what many saw as worrisome political shifts in the Andean region. The White House hoped that Brazil, as an important stakeholder and leader, would also take on the responsibility to push for stability and democracy in South America. During his visit in 2005, George W. Bush recognized Brazil as a ‘leader — …exercising its leadership across the globe’ and reassured Lula that as he ‘works for a better tomorrow, Brazil must know (it has) a strong partner in the United States’.
The US View Today
The events of the last few years and a change in the US administration make Brazil perhaps even more important than ever for US foreign policy. After the worldwide financial meltdown, the relative success of Brazil, China, and other developing economies has definitively shifted the multilateral center of global financial agreements from the G8 to the G20. This gives Brazil a permanent seat going forward in all major global macroeconomic discussions, where it has already become a vital voice in the North-South dialogue.
With climate change a priority for the Obama administration, Brazil’s perceived importance has grown, both on account of its leadership in alternative energy and its fight against deforestation. Brazil already boasts one of the most eco-friendly energy matrices in the world, with 46% of primary energy coming from renewable energies, far above the world average of 8%. In addition, as the majority owner of the planet’s largest rainforest, the Amazon, Brazil will play perhaps the central role in slowing worldwide deforestation, the leading cause of carbon emissions, ahead of the global transportation network.
While still not given as much airtime in Washington as many of its BRIC partners – China in particular – Brazil is seen as an emerging power that the United States can work with, be it on issues of global financial stability, climate change, reform of multilateral institutions (e.g.: the UN, G20, WTO, IMF) or regional security, stability and development.
Stumbling to Translate Interest into Policy
For all these reasons, many in Washington are calling yet again for a new special relationship with Brazil. While this is progress, significant limitations exist to translating growing US interest in Brazil as an emerging power into concrete policies.
On a practical level, the US-Latin America policy community has historically been biased toward Spanish-speaking Latin America. Few in Washington know Brazil well or speak Portuguese. The lack of a dedicated group of experts – both inside and outside of government – limits the constant pressure needed to keep Brazil firmly on the US foreign policy agenda. Adding to this, due to US domestic political battles it took nearly a year for President Obama to confirm his new Ambassador to Brazil. To date, this gap has severely hampered the administration’s ability to create a more dynamic engagement with Brazil.
Beyond these logistical challenges, it is still unclear how best to promote the two countries’ common interests. While they share many concerns in principle, priorities and policies are often not aligned, and at times even in conflict. In the realm of security, the United States prioritizes counterterrorism, which sits low on the list of Brazilian concerns. Regarding drug trafficking, US counter-narcotics assistance to the region often focuses on military responses, while Brazil has tended toward policing and law enforcement solutions. Add to this long-standing suspicion over US military involvement in the region, which recently resurfaced with the Colombian base agreement that granted the US military access to seven Colombian bases to combat drug trafficking and the guerrillas, or US concerns about Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s official visit to Brasilia in November 2009, and these differences may make it difficult to find a middle ground for deeper partnership around security issues in the hemisphere – while highlighting the need for Washington to more openly communicate with its regional partners.
The debate over free trade poses similar dilemmas. While both the US and Brazil rhetorically support the expansion of global free trade through the World Trade Organization’s Doha round and other mechanisms, their fundamental interests often diverge. Brazil wants the reduction and/or elimination of extensive US agricultural subsidies and protections, as well as tariffs on products such as ethanol. The vagaries of US domestic politics will make it difficult to deliver on these demands. The US, in turn, is suspicious of Brazilian protection of its industrial sector, and of what it sees as a weak intellectual property rights regime, and hopes Brazil is willing to change its position on services and market access.
Finally, assuming that Washington stays focused on developing and deepening its relationship with Brazil (a big assumption), it is unclear whether Brazil actually aspires to closer relations with the United States. It might benefit Brazil to keep the northern behemoth at arm’s length, particularly given the role the United States likely envisions for Brazil as an active regional ‘stakeholder’, shouldering greater responsibilities in the hemisphere and acting in US interests.
Conclusion
In recent years, the US view of Brazil has likely changed permanently, recognizing the nation’s importance for regional and world order. Brazil is finally seen by the United States as a genuine emerging power. The enhanced strategic dialogue and cooperative steps taken in recent years in light of this recognition has benefited both countries. Nevertheless, many areas of disengagement and even conflict remain. Whether the newly invoked ‘special relationship’ will be more multifaceted and long-lasting this time than on previous attempts remains to be seen.
Recommendations
• Brazil’s rise as an economic and global emerging power has finally been recognized by the US. To effectively leverage this interest, Washington needs to strengthen the policy community dedicated to Brazil – perhaps separately from Spanish-speaking Latin America, thus reflecting its emerging power status – in order to ensure more thorough and consistent attention to US-Brazil relations.
• Despite the potential, an ambitious ‘special relationship’ may be difficult to achieve. Too many differences in policies and priorities remain, particularly in the areas of security and trade. This is most evident in the context of regional leadership and a broader vision for the Americas.
• Bilateral relations should focus on a more permanent dialogue across multiple issue areas, thus converting growing areas of interest into concrete action and policy on a bilateral and multilateral level.
• The United States and Brazil should identify clear issues and strategies of mutual interest to start deepening the bilateral partnership and multilateral engagement. Energy and climate change, as well as global financial stability, are good starting points.
• The biofuel industry and associated technology development is an area of mutual interest that satisfies national and multilateral ambitions related to climate change. This is an obvious point of intersection between the US and Brazil where bilateral cooperation would have a global impact.
This piece was first published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and is available to download here
Last night Chris Sabatini from the Council of the Americas and I joined Martin Savidge on WorldFocus to discuss the Obama administration’s policy toward Latin America. The conversation focused on natural resources, relations with Cuba, Venezuela and the war on drugs.
Despite the calm, Chile’s presidential election Sunday was one of the transformative political moments in Latin America in recent years. This transformation did not entail street demonstrations, a new constitution or the introduction of 21st-century socialism–yet it was no less radical. Chile has transitioned toward a more pluralistic democracy and away from two decades of electoral dominance by the Concertación–a coalition of mostly Socialists, Radicals and Christian Democrats forged in opposition to the Pinochet military government (1973-1989).
Right-leaning Alianza candidate Sebastián Piñera won the first-round December vote, outpacing Concertación candidate Eduardo Frei by nearly 15 percentage points. Sunday, by a closer margin, Piñera pulled another victory, making him the first elected conservative Chilean leader in several decades.
This was not an election driven by issues or ideology: Both candidates promised to continue Chile’s market-friendly macroeconomic policies and its popular social welfare programs. Instead it was driven by personal stories. Piñera presented himself as an entrepreneur who would foster greater innovation and competitiveness; Frei as a wise, experienced former president (he led the country from 1994 to 2000).
Piñera’s victory suggests a new era for Chile’s politics. It signifies that the right has finally emerged from the shadow of Pinochet’s military dictatorship to become a viable electoral alternative once more, able to lead an open and dynamic country without a fear of backsliding into the past. It is the end of the pro/anti Pinochet political divide–the guiding cleavage of Chile’s politics since the 1970s.
The Concertación’s loss is also in some ways the result of its successes. While many talk of the economic growth and stability brought by Pinochet’s reforms, it is the policies and actions of the governing Concertación coalition that have truly transformed Chile into a modern state. These successive governments–through sound macroeconomic management combined with the creation of a broad social safety net–succeeded in reducing Chile’s poverty rate from nearly 40% in 1990 to just under 14% today (nearly equivalent to U.S. rates). Chile’s now much larger middle class is more politically independent, and Piñera openly wooed this cohort–ultimately successfully.
While highlighting the diminishing role of Chile’s old political fracture, this election also highlighted a new divide–that between the old and the young. While Frei and Piñera came firmly from the old guard, the spectacular rise of Marco Enriquez-Ominami, a 36-year-old filmmaker and former congressman with the Socialist party, upended politics as usual. He became the most successful independent candidate in Chilean history, winning 20% of the first round votes. His strength lay in an emerging middle class focused on the future and open to political change. Whether we see an Enriquez-Ominami candidacy again in four years, this will surely be the last election where the leading candidates’ formative years occurred under the Pinochet regime.
But Chile’s future political challenge will be how to engage its younger generations. Unlike their parents, seared by the turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s, Chile’s youth is politically apathetic. Less than 10% of 18- to 29-year-olds are even registered to vote. Many older citizens are also disillusioned. Polls show that 60% of the population believes that none of the candidates–or their parties–represent their ideas well. As the leftist Concertación tries to recreate a winning strategy and the right Alianza looks to deepen its victory, opening up the political system is vital. Chileans are demanding new approaches and more diversity. This election shows us that after decades of dominance by first the right and then the left, Chile’s politics are now up for grabs.
This op-ed first appeared on Forbes.com
Philip Caputo paints a grim picture of Mexico’s current war on drugs in which appears in the December 2009 issue of The Atlantic. His pessimism reflects more than just skyrocketing murders in places such as Ciudad Juarez, or the seeming inability of the local police forces and courts to get to the bottom of these crimes. His chief concern revolves around Mexico’s military.
Caputo suggests that the military is in cahoots with the drug cartels today, much as they were in the past. Laying out what he can piece together from the few wary interviewees willing to speak to him, he depicts an independent military dismissive of human rights in the best case, and a military turned cartel in the worst. With both the Calderon and the U.S. government pinning their hopes in the war on drugs on this military, either scenario is bad news.
However corrupt the military is today, there is a fundamental difference from the earlier parallels he poses, and these differences matter for Mexico’s future. In the 1980s the secretary of defense was found to be working with no less than three drug cartels, and in the 1990s Mexico’s “drug czar” was discovered to be on the payroll of the Juarez cartel. But these incidences were part of a larger systematic relationship between drug traffickers and the long-standing ruling political party, the PRI. The military’s past drug ties can’t be seen in isolation from an organized system of control and enrichment constructed by the PRI that also encompassed the police, courts, and politicians.
Today, it isn’t that corruption has ended. But it is no longer as centralized and coordinated as in the past. Democratization opened up not just the political system to different political parties, but also the illicit economy – effectively ending the unwritten contracts that existed for years between the PRI and particular drug traffickers.
What this means is that corruption in the military today is more autonomous than in the past – not linked to a larger system, not controlled or checked by any political party, and perhaps not coming from the top of the chain of command. For some, this may be even worse news – well armed forces with no master. But, this shift may also mean that it is now much more possible to attack corruption – whether in the military or other parts of the government. With each pocket today no longer part of the larger functioning of an authoritarian system, a focused combination of vetting, training, prosecution, and long-term institution building could yield results. Mexico’s corruption remains a very difficult, but no longer insurmountable problem. And the current democratic political dynamic – forcing politicians to appeal to voters – may increase the chances that the Mexican government goes down a different road.
This better outcome is by no means guaranteed. It will take an incredible amount of work and resources over a long period of time. But the underlying dynamics today are quite different, and they provide Mexico – and the United States –an opportunity so that in ten years another journalist will not be writing a similar “Fall of Mexico” story.
The Council on Foreign Relations published my podcast on the state of emergency declared by Honduran de facto leader Roberto Micheletti on September 28 — the latest in the political crisis that began with the ousting of President Manuel Zelaya in June. Is the United States sending mixed messages on Honduras? Or is it following through on President Obama’s statement at the Summit of the Americas that the United States is no longer going to make unilateral decisions — that it is going to be up to the region to work together through multilateral institutions? Thus far, former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias has mediated the situation, and the Organization of American States (OAS) has taken the lead in managing the crisis. But because the OAS has been quite ineffective, other regional organizations such as Unasur might start to take a more prominent role in regional issues. By assuming a strong position on the need for Zelaya to be reinstated, Brazil has taken ownership of the political stalemate in Honduras, changing the nature of the conflict and the potential solution. But it remains unclear whether the stalemate will end before the elections in Honduras, currently scheduled for November 29. Time, however, is on the side of the de facto government.
In May 2009 I participated in a workshop entitled “American Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives” sponsored by the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. With a new administration in office, the meeting aimed to formulate and recommend new directions for American policy for each of the major regions of the world. The monograph from the meeting was released today and is available online at: http://www.usnwc.edu/academics/courses/nsdm/documents/Ruger09_WEB.pdf
Along with my own views on U.S.-Latin America relations, you can find writings from Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, and Amb. Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic Researcher at the Naval War College. Assuming Arturo Valenzuela will in fact be confirmed now that Congress is back in session, he will be soon facing the many issues we discussed – public security, sustainable energy, economic advancement, and hemispheric migration among others.
Mexico City’s Zocalo, its main square, is the center of its history, its commerce, and its politics. Encompassing one side is Mexico’s largest Catholic cathedral, built on the ruins of an Aztec temple. On another stands its National Palace, once home to Spanish viceroys, to French-designated Emporer Maximilian I, and to dozens of Mexican presidents. This majestic building boasts the famous 1930s Diego Rivera mural “Epic of the Mexican People – Mexico Today and Tomorrow,” which depicts the sweep of Mexican history from the Aztecs through the Spanish conquest, from independence to the Mexican Revolution, and Rivera’s future aspirations for a workers’ utopia. Decades later, across the courtyard, lies Mexico’s Finance Ministry, modern Mexico’s hallmark of orthodox market economics.
Across from the National Palace sits one of the colonial seats of commerce, today filled with jewelry shops and two prominent hotels. Until very recently the streets and sidewalks of the Zocalo teamed with street vendors and day laborers, offering up their wares and skills – making symbolic Mexico’s center a center for its vast informal labor market.
Mexico City’s Zocalo is also the center of Mexico’s politics. Each year the President comes out on the central balcony to give the grito – celebrating Mexico’s indepdendence day. It is also the epicenter of conflict. It is here in 1938 that President Lázaro Cárdenas announced the nationalization of Mexico’s oil to an overwhelming crowd. In 1988, during the first truly contested Presidential elections of the century, thousands of Cuahtemoc Cardenas’ followers convened to protest election fraud. In 2001, followers of the Zapatistas used this same space to demand greater political autonomy. During the tense weeks after the 2006 Presidential election, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s swore himself in as President in front of thousands of his supporters. Just last year, the Zócalo was filled to capacity during a country-wide protest against crime.
Two recent events point to the vast transformations occurring in Mexico today. The first occurred in May 2007 when New York photographer Spencer Tunick convened a gathering of nearly 20,000 Mexicans on a cool Sunday morning to pose for photographs – naked. Turnout far surpassed similar events held in presumably more liberal cities of Amsterdam, New York, Montreal, and Barcelona. The enthusiastic shedding of inhibitions by the thousands not only created a series of beautiful photographs, but also hint at the seismic cultural, political, and economic shifts occurring in Mexico today.
This last weekend the Zocalo was scheduled to act as a backdrop for a culturally interesting event (though in the end the event was held just up the road in front of the Monument of the Revolution). Thirteen thousand dancers,most in costume, convened to break the Guinness book of world records for Michael Jackson’s “Thriller” reenactment.
That this would occur in Mexico highlights the power of globalization. And, perhaps less dramatically, it points to the many moments of intense fun living within one of the world’s largest and most vibrant cities.
What are the 6 books you find most useful in thinking about Mexican politics? Foreign Affairs asked me for my list. I’d be interested in yours…
Mexico’s rise on the American foreign policy agenda should not come as a surprise. Over the last generation, deepening business, personal, cultural, and community relations have drawn the two countries closer together. Trade between them has tripled, with Mexico becoming the United States’ third-largest commercial partner. Flows of people, always part of the bilateral relationship, skyrocketed: over four million Mexican citizens have headed north in the last decade, while over a million U.S. citizens have migrated south, forming the largest nonmilitary community of American expatriates in the world. At the start of the twenty-first century, Mexico is still forging its political, economic, and social identity. It has undergone a true democratic transformation, and its three political parties now compete in clean and transparent elections. But it remains unclear whether Mexico will follow a path of growth, stability, and market-based democracy or one of instability, corruption, and crime. What is certain is that understanding Mexico — where it came from, how it got there, and where it might be headed — is vital to U.S. interests.
Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation. By Roderic Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, 2006.
In this book, now in its fifth edition, Roderic Ai Camp, one of the preeminent scholars of Mexican politics, deftly guides readers through more than 200 years of political evolution in Mexico, analyzing the events and concerns that created the Mexican state one sees today and exploring both the continuities and changes in that state’s relationship with societal organizations and interests. Camp focuses on Mexico’s extended transition to democracy, including reforms to the electoral process, the expansion of political participation, and the subsequent shifts in power among the various branches of government. Those interested in delving deeper can consult Camp’s specialized works on many of the themes presented, such as the recruitment of political leadership and popular political attitudes. But Politics in Mexico, drawing on decades of experience and innovative research, provides a comprehensive overview of the main issues and forces affecting the country today.
Mexico: Biography of Power. By Enrique Krauze. HarperCollins, 1997.
This exhaustive history, written by one of Mexico’s best-known intellectuals, chronicles nearly two centuries of Mexican politics, from independence to the early 1990s. After identifying major themes underlying the country’s political and social identity — its colonial legacy, its mestizo population, and the early power of the church — Enrique Krauze turns to a leader-driven historical narrative, examining the lives of Mexico’s various strongmen and presidents, who, from the battlefield to the executive office, shaped Mexico’s political development. This personalized dynamic has faded with democratization, but the memory and vestiges of it remain relevant in Mexican politics today.
Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy. By Julia Preston and Sam Dillon. Macmillan, 2005.
Written by Julia Preston and Sam Dillon, the New York Times correspondents covering Mexico in the late 1990s, this readable narrative provides a thoughtful analysis of the country’s democratic opening. Spanning the period from the devastating 1985 earthquake in Mexico City to the 2000 presidential elections, the authors investigate the economic changes, security threats, and political intrigue crucial to understanding the shifts that occurred in Mexican politics. The book explores the many pressures on the old one-party PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) system, the individuals and organizations that pushed for change, and the events leading up to democracy’s final breakthrough: the election of the opposition PAN (National Action Party) presidential candidate Vicente Fox.
First Stop in the New World: Mexico City, the Capital of the Twenty-First Century. By David Lida. Riverhead, 2008.
Spanning 570 square miles and home to more than 20 million people, Mexico City is the largest metropolis in the Western Hemisphere. Even as federalism has decentralized power to Mexico’s states, the capital remains the political, cultural, and economic center of the nation. In this journalistic account, David Lida offers many telling vignettes that capture politics, culture, and life in el D.F., the federal district. He lays out the intricacies of Mexico’s economic inequalities, its sex and age discrimination, its traffic jams, and its deep-seated corruption. But he also illuminates the thriving high- and low-brow art scenes, from well-respected galleries and theaters to lucha libre (Mexico’s version of professional wrestling). Lida explores the country’s cabarets, cantinas, and street food, as well as the coexistence of traditional markets and Wal-Marts that make the city — and Mexico — what it is now.
The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict. By Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro. Routledge, 2001.
At the turn of the twentieth century, strongman Porfirio Díaz lamented, “Poor Mexico! So far from God, so close to the United States.” Some still share that view, but whatever the tone of bilateral relations, all would agree that Mexican politics cannot be understood in isolation from the United States. Expertly dissecting the complicated relationship of these two neighbors, Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War, internal changes within Mexico and the United States, and the creation and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral institutions over the last two decades. The authors show how these multiple factors led to closer ties in areas as diverse as security, the economy, and the border.
The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11. By Edward Alden. Harper, 2008.
Mexico’s possible futures cannot be fully understood without a thorough comprehension of U.S. concerns over and approaches to border management. Edward Alden skillfully investigates the transformations of U.S. border policy since 9/11 — in particular, the rise of immigration enforcement as the predominant means of protecting the United States against further terrorist attacks. This shift has had strong repercussions for Mexico, because of the 2,000-mile-long border it shares with the United States, its estimated ten million citizens living in El Norte, and the deep economic and social links between many U.S. and Mexican communities. It also has had significant consequences for policymakers trying to develop more effective bilateral relations, as this mindset influences approaches to issues of organized crime, trade and economic development, and the health and safety of populations on both sides of the border.
For those of you who may prefer to read in Spanish, my Foreign Affairs article on Mexico has been translated and appears in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica, which you can find here.
Obama and the World: Latin America I talked with WorldFocus’s Martin Savidge about Presidents Obama and Calderon and Prime Minister Harper meeting in Guadalajara.
Executive Summary
Two recent events point to the vast transformations occurring in Mexico today. The first occurred in May 2007 when New York photographer Spencer Tunick convened a gathering of nearly 20,000 Mexicans on a cool Sunday morning to pose for photographs – naked. Turnout far surpassed similar events held in presumably more liberal cities of Amsterdam, New York, Montreal, and Barcelona. The enthusiastic shedding of inhibitions by the thousands not only created a series of beautiful 
